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WHAT’S FAIR FOR CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS SUBJECT TO PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS
Mark A. Strasser*

INTRODUCTION
Weddings are big business, and those celebrating a same-sex union may
wish to engage the services of a baker, a photographer, or a florist.1 Some vendors
with strongly held religious beliefs do not wish to be seen as endorsing same-sex
unions, however, and refuse to provide such services, public accommodation laws
notwithstanding.2 Various courts have been forced to address the conditions, if any,
under which the right not to speak protected by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution immunizes such vendors from sanction. Thus far, state courts
have consistently rejected the proposition that the right not to speak requires such an
exemption to be granted, although the courts have differed in their reasoning. This is
an area in First Amendment law in great need of clarification, at least in part because
so much hangs in the balance. Given the diversity of beliefs in this country, the
recognition of a robust right to refuse to engage with other community members so
as to avoid a possible imputation of endorsement could further balkanize an
increasingly fractured nation.
Part I of this Article discusses the First Amendment protections of the right
not to speak. While that right has been recognized, its contours are much less clear
than many appreciate. Part II discusses some recent cases in which vendors have
refused to provide wedding services for individuals marrying a same-sex partner,
local law notwithstanding. While the reach of First Amendment guarantees requires
further clarification, these cases fall clearly outside of the range of cases recognized
by the Court as receiving that constitutional protection. The Article concludes that
while the Court must do a better job explaining the reach of the First Amendment,
the recognition of the claimed rights at issue in these cases has no basis in current
constitutional law and would be disastrous as a matter of public policy.

* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio
1. See Loren F. Selznick, Running Mom and Pop Businesses by the Good Book: The Scope of
Religious Rights of Business Owners, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1353, 1361 (2014–2015) (discussing “business
owners of faith who provide wedding related services, such as photographers, cake bakers, [and] florists”).
2. Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65
EMORY L.J. 241, 249 (2015) (“Every objecting baker, florist, and photographer who refuses to provide
services for a same-sex ceremony resists sending a particular message, namely, ‘I endorse or condone
same-sex weddings.’”).
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I. THE RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the right not to speak in
several cases. The Court takes the right seriously and affords it constitutional
protection. Nonetheless, the Court’s jurisprudence has evolved in important ways,
requiring previous cases to be understood in a particular light and making the
jurisprudence far less robust than might originally have been thought.
A. Saluting the Flag
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette3 is the seminal case in
the right not to speak jurisprudence.4 At issue was a Board of Education requirement
that students salute the flag while saying: “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the
United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation,
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”5 A student’s refusal to salute the flag and
say the pledge could result in his expulsion.6
This West Virginia requirement put Jehovah’s Witnesses in a difficult
position because of their interpretation of a commandment found in Exodus. The
commandment reads: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any
likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is
in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve
them.”7 Because the Witnesses “consider . . . the flag . . . an ‘image’ within this
command[,] . . . they refuse to salute it.”8 But this meant that Jehovah Witness
children who wished to act in accord with their religious beliefs by refusing to salute
the flag might thereby put themselves9 and their parents in legal jeopardy.10
Jehovah’s Witness parents with children in the public schools challenged
the West Virginia requirement.11 The Court noted that at issue was “a compulsion of
3. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
4. Peter J. Jenkins, Morality and Public School Speech: Balancing the Rights of Students, Parents,
and Communities, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 593, 600 (2008) (“[T]he Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment protects students from being compelled to subscribe to an opinion. The seminal Supreme
Court opinion on this issue [is] Barnette. . . .”); David M. Ranscht, Guidance from an Unlikely Source:
Why a Hollywood Satire Can Help Resolve the Circuit Split Over Whether Mandatory Graphic Cigarette
Package Warning Labels Violate the First Amendment, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 267, 295 (2013) (“Compelledspeech jurisprudence utilizes strict scrutiny to evaluate challenges arising when the government
effectively tells speakers what they must say. The seminal case in this area is West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette. . . .”); Elyse Stiner, The Diminishing Free Speech Rights of Military Chaplains
in the Aftermath of Repealing “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” 1 U. MIAMI NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L.
REV. 227, 257 (2011) (“The seminal case regarding compelled speech is West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette.”).
5. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628–29.
6. Id. at 629 (“Failure to conform is ‘insubordination’ dealt with by expulsion.”).
7. Id. (citing Exodus, ch. 20, verses 4–5).
8. Id.
9. Id. (“[T]he expelled child is ‘unlawfully absent’ and may be proceeded against as a delinquent.”).
10. Id. (“His parents or guardians are liable to prosecution, and if convicted are subject to fine not
exceeding $50 and jail term not exceeding thirty days.”).
11. Id. (“Appellees, citizens of the United States and of West Virginia, brought suit in the United
States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated asking its injunction to restrain
enforcement of these laws and regulations against Jehovah’s Witnesses.”). See also Barnette v. W. Va.
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students to declare a belief.”12 The difficulty posed by this forced declaration of
belief was not that students were asked to utter certain words but that “the
compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of
mind.”13 The Court struck down the requirement,14 reasoning: “If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”15
The Court was careful to cabin the right it was recognizing, noting that
“[t]he freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with
rights asserted by any other individual.”16 Where such conflicts occur, the State may
be forced “to determine where the rights of one end and those of another begin.”17
However, in this case, the right of others to participate in the ceremony would not be
affected merely because Jehovah’s Witnesses were exempted from the
requirement.18
One confusing aspect of Barnette involved the Court’s rationale. When the
Court suggested that public officials are prohibited from “prescrib[ing] what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or forc[ing]
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein,”19 the Court was not entirely
clear about what the officials were forcing citizens to confess. While the Witnesses
believed that saluting the flag would inappropriately put the law of man over the Law
of God,20 it was not clear that the officials viewed the salute that way or that the
public did either.21 Certainly, a student saluting the flag while reciting the Pledge
involves some kind of expression,22 although individuals might disagree about the
content of that expression, for example, whether by saluting the flag one was

State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 252 (S.D. W. Va. 1942) (“This is a suit by three persons belonging
to the sect known as ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses’, who have children attending the public schools of West
Virginia, against the Board of Education of that state.”), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
12. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631.
13. Id. at 633.
14. Id. at 642 (“[T]he action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 630.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 630 (“But the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with
or deny rights of others to do so.”).
19. Id. at 642.
20. Cf. id. at 629 (“The Witnesses are an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed
by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government.”).
21. Cf. Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D. W. Va. 1942) (“[F]rom our
point of view, we see nothing in the salute which could reasonably be held a violation of any of the
commandments in the Bible or of any of the duties owing by man to his Maker.”); see also Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (“[B]y this law the state seeks to coerce these children to
express a sentiment which, as they interpret it, they do not entertain, and which violates their deepest
religious convictions.” (Stone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
22. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632 (“There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag
salute is a form of utterance.”).
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undermining the Witnesses’ beliefs by affirming the superiority of man-made law
over God’s law23 or, instead, was merely affirming one’s patriotism.
B. Promulgating the State Motto
The next in this line of cases, Wooley v. Maynard,24 not only did not clarify
this issue but added additional elements of possible confusion. At issue was a New
Hampshire law requiring “noncommercial vehicles [to] bear license plates embossed
with the state motto, ‘Live Free or Die.’”25 Another law prohibited individuals from
obscuring letters or numbers on the license plate26 including the state motto.27
George and Maxine Maynard, Jehovah’s Witnesses, considered the state
motto repugnant to their religious beliefs and began covering it up.28 Maynard was
charged with and convicted of covering up the motto and eventually served jail time
for doing so.29 The Maynards filed in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the New
Hampshire statute against them.30 The District Court found in favor of the
Maynards.31
The Supreme Court held that a state may not “require an individual to
participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his
private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read
by the public.”32 New Hampshire’s requiring George Maynard to have the state
motto “Live Free or Die” unobscured on his license plate forced him “as part of his
daily life—indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view—to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable.”33 Because the New Hampshire statute “in effect require[d] that
appellees use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological
message—or suffer a penalty,”34 the Court found that the New Hampshire law

23. See Paul M. Frazier, The Stubborn Child of Frazier v. Winn: How and Why Some Parental
Consent Requirements Are Unconstitutional, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 209, 213 (2011) (explaining that
according to the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ understanding “[a]ny profession of loyalty to man-made
government must also acknowledge Jehovah God as the object of their supreme devotion and allegiance”).
24. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
25. Id. at 707.
26. Id. (“Another New Hampshire statute makes it a misdemeanor ‘knowingly (to obscure) . . . the
figures or letters on any number plate.’”) (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1975)).
27. Id. (“The term ‘letters’ in this section has been interpreted by the State’s highest court to include
the state motto.”) (citing State v. Hoskin, 295 A.2d 454 (N.H. 1972)).
28. Id. at 707–08.
29. Id. at 708 (“Maynard informed the court that, as a matter of conscience, he refused to pay the two
fines. The court thereupon sentenced him to jail for a period of 15 days. He has served the full sentence.”).
30. Id. at 709.
31. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (D. N.H. 1976) (“[D]efendants are enjoined from
arresting and prosecuting plaintiffs at any time in the future for covering over that portion of their license
plates that contains the motto ‘Live Free or Die.’”), aff’d, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
32. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713.
33. Id. at 715.
34. Id.
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violated First Amendment guarantees.35 Here, the Court suggested that individuals
could not be forced by the state to use their private property to promulgate a message
with which they disagreed.36
Yet, the Court offered an additional rationale that was more clearly
connected to the right not to speak recognized in Barnette. The Wooley Court
explained: “The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of
mind.’”37 While admitting that “[c]ompelling the affirmative act of a flag salute
involved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the passive act of
carrying the state motto on a license plate”38 the Court believed that “the difference
[was] essentially one of degree.”39 The New Hampshire law could not pass muster
because the State had “invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control.”40 But the right not to have the sphere of intellect and spirit invaded by the
State required further explication. Was the difficulty that the Maynards were forced
to affirm the message on the plate? In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist addressed that
concern, arguing that “[t]he State has not forced appellees to ‘say’ anything; and it
has not forced them to communicate ideas with nonverbal actions reasonably likened
to ‘speech.’”41 In this case, there was “no affirmation of belief.”42
Just as the First Amendment protected Barnette, “[t]he First Amendment
protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority
and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find
morally objectionable.”43 Further, as had been true in Barnette, it did not matter that
most people did not find the contested practice objectionable.44 Instead, “where the
State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such
interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming
the courier for such message.”45 Here, the Court’s focus was not on whether the
Maynards were forced to affirm something that they did not believe but on whether
they were forced to promulgate a message of the State with which they disagreed.
An individual may have different reasons to oppose being forced to carry a
state message that she rejects. She might object to being used that way even when it
35. Id. (“The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from
the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally
objectionable.”).
36. See Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 210 (2005) (“This suggests that Wooley is not so much about George
Maynard’s First Amendment interest in not being forced to speak as it is about his First Amendment
interest in not having his property appropriated to subsidize government speech.”).
37. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
38. Id. at 715.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
41. Id. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 715.
44. See id. (“The fact that most individuals agree with the thrust of New Hampshire’s motto is not
the test; most Americans also find the flag salute acceptable.”).
45. Id. at 717.
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is absolutely clear to everyone that she disagrees with the message. Or, she might
fear that onlookers would wrongly infer that she agrees with the message. As Justice
Rehnquist pointed out in dissent, if the difficulty were that individuals might wrongly
attribute the state motto to the Maynards, the “appellees could place on their bumper
a conspicuous bumper sticker explaining in no uncertain terms that they do not
profess the motto ‘Live Free or Die’ and that they violently disagree with the
connotations of that motto.”46 Thus, were the only difficulty that the Maynards feared
that others would mistakenly attribute to them endorsement of the state motto, there
were ways other than obscuring the license plate to avoid that mistaken attribution
of viewpoint.
Wooley and Barnette are analogous in some important respects. In each
case, the state was prescribing particular words that had to be expressed.47 Further,
those words were in conflict with beliefs that the individuals actually held.48
Yet, the cases are not analogous in other respects. In Barnette, the Court
suggested that the child was required to affirm particular beliefs,49 whereas in Wooley
the Court did not suggest that the motto on the license plate forced the Maynards to
affirm certain beliefs.50 If the evil addressed in Barnette only involved preventing
the State from forcing individuals to make affirmations that they did not believe, then
Barnette would not control the result in Wooley.51
The harm imposed in Wooley was arguably greater than the harm imposed
in Barnette in at least one respect. While the pledge and salute at issue in Barnette
were to be part of the regular program in the schools,52 there was no suggestion that
it had to be done frequently throughout the day. In contrast, the Wooley Court noted
that the “state measure . . . forces an individual, as part of his daily life—indeed
constantly while his automobile is in public view—to be an instrument for fostering
public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”53 Perhaps
the harms in Barnette and Wooley were related but distinct. In Barnette, the State
required an affirmation of something disbelieved, whereas in Wooley the State
required unwilling individuals to be promulgators of a state message throughout the
day or, at least, whenever their car was in public.
It is unclear whether the difficulty posed in Wooley was that onlookers
would wrongly attribute a view to the Maynards or, instead, that the state was

46. Id. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (“Wooley, however, was a case
in which the government itself prescribed the message, . . . .”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.”).
48. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629; Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707 (“The Maynards consider the New
Hampshire State motto to be repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs.”).
49. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
50. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[H]aving recognized the rather obvious differences
between these two cases, the Court does not explain why the same result should obtain.”).
52. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626.
53. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
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requiring the Maynards to be a mobile billboard for a message crafted by the state.54
The former interpretation of Wooley, although possible, seems less persuasive55 both
because the message on the plate would more likely be attributed to the state than
the Maynards56 and because any misattribution of message could be corrected by
affixing the bumper sticker suggested by Justice Rehnquist.57
C. Hosting the Speech of Others
The Court explained its decision in Wooley more fully in PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins,58 although a little background is necessary to see how
Wooley was even implicated. Fred Sahadi owned the PruneYard Shopping Center.59
The Shopping Center had a policy that no one was permitted to engage in expressive
activity unrelated to the center’s commercial purposes.60
Some high school students set up a card table in a central courtyard at the
mall seeking to promote opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism.61
The California Supreme Court held that the students’ right to engage in this form of
expression was protected by the California Constitution.62 At issue was whether the
mall owner’s First Amendment right not to speak was violated by the state
requirement that he permit individuals to present a message with which he
disagreed.63
The mall owner argued that the Wooley Court had concluded that “a State
may not constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of
an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for
the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public.”64 But the PruneYard
Court explained that in Maynard “the government itself prescribed the message,
[and] required it to be displayed openly on appellee’s personal property that was used
54. See Mark Strasser, Ignore the Man Behind the Curtain: On the Government Speech Doctrine and
What It Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85, 122 (2011) (“One cannot tell whether the constitutional worry
was that individuals were required to convey the state’s message against their will . . . or whether, instead,
the Court was worried that the messenger would be wrongly thought to agree with the message.”).
55. See Steven H. Shiffrin, What Is Wrong with Compelled Speech?, 29 J.L. & POL. 499, 505 (2014)
(“In Wooley v. Maynard, it is doubtful that anyone thinks a motorist subscribes to the motto ‘Live Free or
Die’ merely because the governmental slogan appears on his license plate.”).
56. Mark Strasser, Passive Observers, Passive Displays, and the Establishment Clause, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1123, 1131 (2010) (suggesting that “the views exhibited on the license plate were much
more likely to be attributed to the state than to the Maynards”).
57. See supra note 46.
58. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
59. Id. at 77 (“The PruneYard is owned by appellant Fred Sahadi.”).
60. Id. (“The PruneYard is open to the public for the purpose of encouraging the patronizing of its
commercial establishments. It has a policy not to permit any visitor or tenant to engage in any publicly
expressive activity . . . that is not directly related to its commercial purposes.”).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 78 (“The California Supreme Court [held] . . . that the California Constitution protects
‘speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately
owned.’ It concluded that appellees were entitled to conduct their activity on PruneYard property.”) (citing
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
63. Id. at 85 (“Appellants finally contend that a private property owner has a First Amendment right
not to be forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others.”).
64. Id. at 86–87.
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‘as part of his daily life. . . .’”65 In contrast, in this case, “the shopping center . . . is
not limited to the personal use of appellants[,] . . . [but] is instead a business
establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please.”66 In addition,
“[t]he views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking
signatures for a petition . . . will not likely be identified with those of the owner.”67
Further, in case the owner was worried that the views might falsely be attributed to
him, he could “expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply
posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand.”68 The mall owner
“could disclaim any sponsorship of the message and could explain that the persons
are communicating their own messages by virtue of state law.”69
In Wooley, the possibility that the Maynards could disclaim the message did
not suffice to save the state law from invalidation, which suggests that the state
prescribing the message and requiring its dissemination were among the factors
convincing the Court that the statute could not stand.70 In PruneYard, where the state
was neither prescribing the message nor requiring the dissemination of any particular
content, the ability of the mall owner to engage in self-help and disclaim sponsorship
helped save the California requirement from invalidation.71
D. Hosting State Employers and Disclaiming Messages
One issue involves clarifying which individual is making a clearly
identifiable message, e.g., opposition to a United Nations resolution. A different
issue involves whether a particular activity in fact communicates a message, a matter
that was analyzed in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.
(FAIR).72
At issue in FAIR was a congressional requirement (the “Solomon
Amendment”73) that “[i]n order for a law school and its university to receive federal
funding, the law school must offer military recruiters the same access to its campus
and students that it provides to the nonmilitary recruiter receiving the most favorable
access.”74 At the time, the military barred those with a same-sex orientation from
serving.75 This put law schools with policies banning orientation discrimination in a

65. Id. at 87.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 847,
857 (2011) (“[T]he character of the shopping center as a commercial establishment open to the public
meant that observers would probably not identify the views expressed by the students with those of
PruneYard’s owner.”).
68. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87. See also Stern, supra note 67, at 857 (“PruneYard could dispel any
danger that someone might misinterpret a speaker’s views as PruneYard’s own simply by posting a
disclaimer of such a connection.”).
69. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.
70. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
72. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
73. See id. at 51.
74. Id. at 55.
75. Id. at 52 n.1 (“Under this policy, a person generally may not serve in the Armed Forces if he has
engaged in homosexual acts, stated that he is a homosexual, or married a person of the same sex.”).
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difficult position. If they allowed the military to interview on-campus, they would
be permitting an employer who flouted their nondiscrimination policy to use their
facilities. FAIR, “an association of law schools and law faculties,”76 challenged the
Solomon Amendment “because it forced law schools to choose between exercising
their First Amendment right to decide whether to disseminate or accommodate a
military recruiter’s message, and ensuring the availability of federal funding for their
universities.”77
The Court explained that the “Solomon Amendment neither limits what law
schools may say nor requires them to say anything.”78 But the Court’s claim was not
entirely accurate in that the amendment required law schools to “offer military
recruiters the same access to its campus and students that it provides to the
nonmilitary recruiter receiving the most favorable access.”79 That meant that if law
schools “send e-mails or post notices on bulletin boards on [a non-military]
employer’s behalf,”80 then they “must also send e-mails and post notices on behalf
of the military.”81 That said, however, the Government “does not dictate the content
of the speech at all, which is only ‘compelled’ if, and to the extent, the school
provides such speech for other recruiters.”82
The FAIR Court explained that any speech required of the law schools, for
example, “[t]he U.S. Army recruiter will meet interested students in Room 123 at 11
a.m.,”83 would merely be “incidental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of
conduct.”84 Not only did the Congress refuse to specify the particular content that
had to be included in any communications when the law schools were fulfilling the
requirement that military employers be given equal access, but there was “nothing in
this case approaching a Government-mandated pledge or motto that the school must
endorse.”85
When referring to the Government-mandated pledge or motto, the FAIR
Court was referring to Barnette and Wooley.86 But by contrasting what was at issue
in FAIR with what had been issue in Barnette and Wooley by saying that the former,
unlike the latter, involved the absence of a mandated pledge or motto that had to be
endorsed implies that the difficulty posed in Wooley was that the Maynards had to
endorse “Live Free or Die” rather than that they had to be a mobile billboard for the
State. However, the FAIR Court also described Wooley as involving New
Hampshire’s “forcing a Jehovah’s Witness to display the motto ‘Live Free or Die,’”87
so it was not clear whether the Court believed that being forced to display the motto

76. Id. at 52.
77. Id. at 53.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 55.
80. Id. at 61.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 62.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 62.
85. Id.
86. See id. (“This sort of recruiting assistance, however, is a far cry from the compelled speech in
Barnette and Wooley.”).
87. Id.
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was in effect a forced endorsement or whether, instead, the Court did not believe that
New Hampshire was requiring the Maynards to affirm the motto.
The FAIR Court reasoned that “[t]he compelled-speech violation in . . .
[other] cases, . . . resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker’s own message
was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate.”88 Here, however, because
“[a] law school’s recruiting services lack the expressive quality of a parade, . . . its
accommodation of a military recruiter’s message is not compelled speech because
the accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with any message of the school.”89
The law schools disagreed, noting that “if they treat military and nonmilitary
recruiters alike in order to comply with the Solomon Amendment, they could be
viewed as sending the message that they see nothing wrong with the military’s
policies, when they do.”90 But the Court was unpersuaded, suggesting that law
students, like high school students, “can appreciate the difference between speech a
school sponsors and speech the school permits because legally required to do so,
pursuant to an equal access policy.”91 Further, it was not as if law schools were
precluded from expressly disavowing the military policy—”nothing in the Solomon
Amendment restricts what the law schools may say about the military’s policies.”92
In FAIR, because the government was not dictating a particular message and because
law schools were free to disavow the message that they thought might wrongly be
attributed to them, the government was not running afoul of First Amendment
guarantees.
Not only were law schools free to express their disagreement with military
policy, but the Court rejected that law schools were engaging in expressive conduct
by hosting military recruiters. That the law schools believed that such activity was
“expressive” was not dispositive—the Court itself had to “consider whether the
expressive nature of the conduct regulated by the statute brings that conduct within
the First Amendment’s protection.”93
The FAIR Court rejected that “conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”94 Instead, the
Court “extend[s] First Amendment protection only to conduct that is inherently
expressive.”95 Conduct is inherently expressive when no accompanying speech is
necessary to explain it—“[t]he fact that . . . explanatory speech is necessary is strong
evidence that the conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive that it warrants
protection. . . .”96
The messages, including the time and place that the military would meet
with students seeking employment, were inherently expressive.97 But that inherently
expressive statement did not itself speak to the law school message that the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 65–66 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 62.
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Government was allegedly trying to change, namely, the school’s position on the
military policy. One could not tell what view, if any, the school had about the
military’s discriminatory policy from a school announcement that military
representatives will be in room 123 for their scheduled appointments.
Prior to the passage of the Solomon Amendment, “law schools ‘expressed’
their disagreement with the military by treating military recruiters differently from
other recruiters.”98 However, the mere fact of differential treatment would not alone
be enough to establish the intended message—such “actions were expressive only
because the law schools accompanied their conduct with speech explaining it.”99 For
example,
[a]n observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away from
the law school has no way of knowing whether the law school is
expressing its disapproval of the military, all the law school’s
interview rooms are full, or the military recruiters decided for
reasons of their own that they would rather interview someplace
else.100
By the same token, a law school choice to permit the military to interview
on campus might be interpreted in a variety of ways. It might mean that while the
law school disagrees with the military’s discriminatory policy, the law school (or,
perhaps, the university as a whole) cannot afford to do without the federal funding
that would be lost were the school to refuse to host the military recruiters on campus.
Or, it might mean that the school agrees with the military policy. Or, it might mean
that while the school has no opinion about the military policy, it wants to maximize
employment opportunities for its students. Or, it might mean something else.
FAIR is important because it limits what qualifies as expressive conduct for
First Amendment purposes. It was not enough that the law schools believed that their
doing something (permitting the military to interview on campus) communicated a
message that they did not wish to send. Nor was it enough that their doing something
else (prohibiting the military from interviewing on campus) might have
communicated a different message. If the alleged message could only be understood
with explanatory speech accompanying it, then the requirement that the school do
something that it did not want to do was not in violation of First Amendment
guarantees because the required conduct was not itself sufficiently expressive to
trigger the relevant guarantees. Further, merely because the policy regulating
conduct might incidentally require law schools to speak would not trigger First
Amendment guarantees.
While Barnette and Wooley both stand for the proposition that the First
Amendment protects the right not to speak under certain conditions, those conditions
need to be spelled out more fully. Both of the cases involved government-prescribed
speech, so their applicability in contexts where the government is not specifying
contents of others’ speech is an open question. It is simply unclear whether an
important aspect of the right not to speak jurisprudence is that an individual is being

98. Id. at 66.
99. Id.
100. Id.

Winter 2018

WHAT'S FAIR FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

135

asked to expressly affirm something contrary to his or her belief. Nor is it clear
whether an important part of that analysis involves whether the activity would be
understood by others (without further explanatory statement) as an affirmation.
Subsequent cases like PruneYard and FAIR emphasize ways in which one
can avoid the misattribution of endorsement through disavowal. Even where one
does not expressly disavow a particular position, one can assume that the public will
take into account background law when attributing endorsement. If one is a mall
owner in a state requiring such owners to permit individuals to express political or
social views on site, then the public will not assume that views expressed at the mall
are endorsed by the mall owner. A law school that is required to permit the military
to interview students on campus will not be assumed to agree with military policy.
The First Amendment protects inherently expressive conduct, but the public
must be able to understand the conduct’s message without explanatory speech
accompanying it. Where explanatory speech is necessary, the activity itself is likely
not triggering First Amendment protection. Where the public does not understand
the message without accompanying explanatory language, a challenged regulation is
unlikely to be construed as forcing one to change one’s message if only because the
explanatory language (which would have been necessary anyway) can make clear
what one does or does not believe. Further, regulations of conduct incidentally
affecting speech need not thereby trigger First Amendment guarantees.
II. VENDORS AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO PROVIDING
WEDDING-RELATED SERVICES
Recently, a number of vendors have refused as a matter of conscience to
provide services to same-sex couples who wished to celebrate marriage or
commitment ceremonies. Because these vendors did not approve of same-sex
marriage, they believed that their providing photos, flowers, or a cake would have
communicated a message that they did not wish to communicate. Courts in differing
jurisdictions have sought to determine whether First Amendment guarantees
preclude the imposition of sanctions against such vendors, even when those refusals
are in violation of local law.
A. Photographic Services
At issue in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock101 was whether a
commercial photographer violated the New Mexico public accommodations law by
refusing to provide photographic services to a same-sex couple.102 While the two
women denied service in this case sought to have their commitment ceremony rather
than their wedding photographed, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided to “use
the terms ‘wedding’ and ‘commitment ceremony’ interchangeably”103 and analyzed
the question as if the photographer had refused to photograph a same-sex wedding.104
101. 2013-NMSC-040, 309 P.3d 53.
102. Id. ¶ 1.
103. Id. ¶ 7 n.1.
104. See id. ¶ 15 (“Elane Photography is primarily a wedding photography business. It provides
wedding photography services to heterosexual couples, but it refuses to work with homosexual couples
under equivalent circumstances.”).
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The first question was whether the public accommodations law even
covered the photographer in question. Because the photographer offered services to
the public, the photographer was subject to that antidiscrimination law.105 Indeed,
the studio did not even contest that its services were subject to the public
accommodations statute.106
Elane Photography claimed that it did not violate the New Mexico Human
Rights Act because it did not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation but,
rather, it was simply acting in light of its religious beliefs against same-sex
marriage.107 After all, “it would have taken portrait photographs and performed other
services for same-sex customers, so long as they did not request photographs that
involved or endorsed same-sex weddings.”108 Further, the studio would have refused
to take a photo of heterosexuals if such a photo would have suggested endorsement
of same-sex marriage. For example, the studio “would have declined the request even
if the ceremony was part of a movie and the actors playing the same-sex couple were
heterosexual.”109
The New Mexico Supreme Court was “not persuaded by Elane
Photography’s argument that it does not violate the NMHRA because it will
photograph a gay person (for example, in single-person portraits) so long as the
photographs do not reflect the client’s sexual preferences.”110 Once the court
determined that the photographer’s refusal constituted orientation discrimination
under the law, the question then became whether the studio’s First Amendment rights
precluded application of the NMHRA against it in this particular context.111
Elane Photography claimed that it would be forced to say something
contrary to belief if forced to photograph same-sex weddings.112 Because
photography is an expressive art form113 and because Elane Photography “creates
and edits photographs for its clients so as to tell a positive story about each wedding
it photographs,”114 Elane Photography claimed that it would be in an impossible

105. See id. ¶ 6 (“‘Public accommodation’ is defined in the NMHRA as ‘any establishment that
provides or offers its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to the public, but does not include a
bona fide private club or other place or establishment that is by its nature and use distinctly private.’”)
(citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(H) (2011)). See also id. (“a business that elects not to offer its goods
or services to the public is not subject to the NMHRA”).
106. Id. ¶ 1 (“Elane Photography . . . does not contest its public accommodation status under the
NMHRA.”).
107. Id. ¶ 14 (“Elane Photography argues that it did not violate the NMHRA because it did not
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation when it refused service to Willock.”).
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting transcript of Commission’s January 28, 2008 hearing at 125).
110. Id. ¶ 19.
111. See id. ¶ 1 (“The questions presented [include] . . . whether this application of the NMHRA
violates either the Free Speech or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. . . .”).
112. Id. ¶ 21 (“Elane Photography argues that the NMHRA compels it to speak in violation of the First
Amendment by requiring it to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony, even though it is against
the owners’ personal beliefs.”).
113. Id. ¶ 23 (“Elane Photography observes that photography is an expressive art form and that
photographs can fall within the constitutional protections of free speech.”).
114. Id.
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position, because “the company and its owners would prefer not to send a positive
message about same-sex weddings or same-sex marriage.”115
Elane Photography read the governing case law to stand for the proposition
that “the government may not compel people ‘to engage in unwanted expression.’”116
But the New Mexico Supreme Court offered a narrower reading of Wooley and
Barnette that merely precluded the government from “prescrib[ing] what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”117 The difference in the two
interpretations was important because the New Mexico Human Rights Act did “not
require Elane Photography to recite or display any message.”118 Indeed that law did
“not even require Elane Photography to take photographs,”119 but merely
“mandate[d] that if Elane Photography operates a business as a public
accommodation, it cannot discriminate against potential clients based on their sexual
orientation.”120
The New Mexico Supreme Court likened Elane Photography to the law
schools in FAIR.121 Not only was Elane (like the law schools) not forced to express
the government’s approved message,122 but Elane Photography could publicize its
own position by posting a disclaimer that it did not approve of same-sex marriage.123
Suppose that Elane Photography did not wish to do what the New Mexico
Supreme Court said that it could do, namely, publicize its opposition to same-sex
unions. Even so, the public still would be unlikely to mistakenly attribute approval
of same-sex unions to the studio. First, as was analogously true in FAIR, the public
would not know Elane Photography’s view on same-sex unions one way or the other
from the fact of its having photographed the ceremony in question,124 especially
given the public accommodations law. Perhaps the studio approved of same-sex
marriage. Perhaps the studio disapproved of same-sex marriage, but nonetheless
provided the service because of the law.125 Or, perhaps the studio needed the work.
Further, the public would not know what to make of Elane Photography’s not having
115. Id.
116. Id. ¶ 27.
117. Id. (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. ¶ 29 (“Elane Photography’s argument here is more analogous to the claims raised by the law
schools in Rumsfeld.”). See also Shiffrin, supra note 55, at 509 (“The FAIR case speaks loudly against the
photographer’s claim in Willock.”).
122. Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 31 (“[T]he NMHRA does not require any affirmation
of belief by regulated public accommodations; instead, it requires businesses that offer services to the
public at large to provide those services without regard for race, sex, sexual orientation, or other protected
classifications.” (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(F) (2011))).
123. Id. ¶ 3 (“They may, for example, post a disclaimer on their website or in their studio advertising
that they oppose same-sex marriage but that they comply with applicable antidiscrimination laws.”).
124. Mark Strasser, Speech, Association, Conscience, and the First Amendment’s Orientation, 91
DENV. U. L. REV. 495, 528 (2014) (“Because it would be unlikely for an observer to impute a particular
view to the photographer, the United States Supreme Court would reject that this would be a case of
compelled speech, just as the FAIR Court rejected that law schools were being compelled to speak.”).
125. Corbin, supra note 2, at 276 (“But just because the photographer has communicated something,
it does not mean it is her approval of same-sex marriage.”).
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photographed such ceremonies—perhaps the studio was taking a religious stand
against such unions or perhaps the studio was taking no such stand but simply had
not been asked to take the photographs. It is not as if the photographs themselves are
routinely published or displayed to the public, because they are for the clients and
the clients’ friends and family,126 so the public would likely not be thinking about
the studio’s views one way or another. The studio, itself, chose the photos used to
advertise its services to the public, and the public accommodations law did not
require that the studio include photos of same-sex couples within its advertising.127
In short, the studio’s taking the photographs would not itself have communicated a
message in support of same-sex unions and the studio’s failure to take photos would
not itself have communicated opposition to such unions. The studio could have
included explanatory language that would have communicated the desired message,
but that was also true of the law schools in FAIR.
Elane Photography was not exempted from the New Mexico Human Rights
Act because of the artistic nature of photography128—the New Mexico court
explained that Elane Photography’s “provision of services can be regulated, even
though those services include artistic and creative work.”129 While the studio had not
wanted to portray same-sex unions in a positive light, an analogous point might have
been made about the law schools who had not wanted to portray the military in a
positive light by permitting them to interview on-campus. While both Elane
Photography and the law schools understood which messages they wanted to send
and which messages they did not want to send, the contents of those messages would
not have been understood by the public without explanation.
If those who engage in creative or artistic work are exempted from public
accommodations laws, then such laws will not apply to a whole host of people. Many
individuals use judgment and creativity in their jobs,130 and many individuals provide
artistic or expressive services.131 Recognition of such an exemption would severely
dilute if not destroy the efficacy of public accommodations law.132
The Elane Photography court recognized that there would be important
implications if businesses were permitted to refuse service to those whom the
businesses do not wish to endorse. For example, “a photographer who was a Klan
member [could] refuse to photograph an African–American customer’s wedding,
graduation, newborn child, or other event if the photographer felt that the
photographs would cast African–Americans in a positive light or be interpreted as
126. Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 42 (“Elane Photography does not routinely publish for
or display its wedding photographs to the public. Instead, it creates an album for each customer and posts
the photographs on a password-protected website for the customers and their friends and family to view.”).
127. Id. ¶ 43 (“[W]hen Elane Photography displays its photographs publicly and on its own behalf,
rather than for a client, such as in advertising, its choices of which photographs to display are entirely its
own. The NMHRA does not require Elane Photography to either include photographs of same-sex couples
in its advertisements or display them in its studio.”).
128. Id. ¶ 52 (“There are no cases from either New Mexico jurisprudence or that of the United States
Supreme Court that would compel a conclusion that the NMHRA violates Elane Photography’s freedom
of speech because it is engaged in a creative and expressive profession.”).
129. Id. ¶ 35.
130. See Strasser, supra note 124, at 524–25.
131. Id. at 525.
132. Id.
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the photographer’s endorsement of African–Americans.”133 Examples in addition to
those provided by the New Mexico court readily come to mind—photographers
could refuse to photograph events involving individuals of other faiths to avoid
putting those individuals in a positive light.134 In short, permitting the exemption in
this case might seriously undermine public accommodations laws as a general
matter.135
B. Baked Goods
Just as photographers might claim to have sincere objections to endorsing
same-sex unions, bakers might do so as well. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.
involved the refusal of Jack C. Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop,136 to
provide Charlie Craig and David Mullins with a cake to celebrate their same-sex
wedding.137 However, Phillips “advis[ed] Craig and Mullins that he would be happy
to make and sell them any other baked goods.”138
The Colorado public accommodations law precludes discriminating inter
alia on the basis of sexual orientation.139 Just as was true in Elane Photography, the
fact that Masterpiece Bakeshop was a place of public accommodation was not
contested in this case.140 Just as was true in Elane Photography, the business in this
case claimed not to be discriminating on the basis of orientation but, instead, to be
acting in light of its opposition to same-sex marriage.141 The Colorado court rejected
the bakery’s denial that it was engaging in orientation discrimination.142

133. Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 56.
134. Jennifer Ann Abodeely, Comment, Thou Shall Not Discriminate: A Proposal for Limiting First
Amendment Defenses to Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 12 SCHOLAR 585, 589 (2010) (“If the
facts of the case were different and Elane Photography refused to photograph a Jewish wedding or an
interracial wedding, even if those unions were against Huguenin’s faith, there would be no question that
the business could not legally discriminate based on customers’ race or religion.”).
135. See Recent Case, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1485, 1489 (2014) (“The court believed an opinion permitting such a refusal would effectively
‘undermine all of the protections provided by antidiscrimination laws,’ and thus the court could not
condone a holding that exempted commercial photographers from the NMHRA.”) (citing Elane
Photography, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 56).
136. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied sub nom.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr.
25, 2016).
137. Id. (“Craig and Mullins visited Masterpiece, a bakery in Lakewood, Colorado, and requested that
Phillips design and create a cake to celebrate their same-sex wedding. Phillips declined, telling them that
he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs.”).
138. Id.
139. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2017).
140. Craig, 370 P.3d. at 277 (“Masterpiece and Phillips admitted that the bakery is a place of public
accommodation.”).
141. Id. at 279 (“Masterpiece asserts that its refusal to create the cake was ‘because of’ its opposition
to same-sex marriage, not because of its opposition to their sexual orientation.”).
142. Id. at 283 (“CADA [Colorado Anti–Discrimination Act] prohibits places of public
accommodations from basing their refusal to serve customers on their sexual orientation, and Masterpiece
violated Colorado’s public accommodations law by refusing to create a wedding cake for Craig’s and
Mullins’ same-sex wedding celebration.”). See also In the Matter of: Melissa Elaine Klein Aaron Wayne
Klein, 2015 WL 4868796, at *19 (“This case is not about a wedding cake or a marriage. It is about a
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The question then became whether forcing the Masterpiece Cakeshop to
make the wedding cake would involve forcing it to speak against its will.143 The
Cakeshop believed that “wedding cakes inherently convey a celebratory message
about marriage,”144 and so forcing it to make such a cake would force it to endorse a
wedding that it did not wish to endorse. But some of the reasons undercutting the
persuasiveness of Elane Photography’s claim that it was being forced to speak
against its will applied with equal force to undercut the similar claim of Masterpiece
Bakeshop. Here, too, the public would not know Masterpiece Cakeshop’s view of
same-sex marriage from its having chosen to create such a cake in a state with an
anti-discrimination law. Perhaps it supported same-sex unions. Perhaps not. So, too,
the public would not have known the Cakeshop’s view of same-sex marriage from
its failure to provide such a cake. Perhaps it was expressing opposition to same-sex
marriage or perhaps it had so many orders that it could not take another one.
Suppose that Craig and Mullins had accepted Phillips’ offer to provide other
baked goods, perhaps because they decided that they wanted cupcakes instead.
Would the message communicated by Masterpiece Cakeshop’s provision of
cupcakes be support for same-sex marriage (because it was providing baked goods
for the celebration), opposition to same-sex marriage (because cupcakes rather than
a cake were provided), or no message (because as far as the public knew Craig and
Mullins might have wanted cupcakes all along or because the public would not have
known in the first place what the Cakeshop had or had not provided)?
The Colorado appellate court rejected that a bakery’s preparing a wedding
cake for same-sex customers would express a message of approval of same-sex
marriage.145 Instead, the public might well impute to the bakery a desire to follow
the law rather than express a position on same-sex marriage.146 The court did not
address whether its position would have been different had the couple wanted
something in particular written on the cake.147 Yet, it seems likely that just as the
public would have attributed the wedding cake’s celebratory message to the

business’s refusal to serve someone because of their sexual orientation. Under Oregon law, that is
illegal.”).
143. Craig, 370 P.3d at 283 (“Masterpiece argues that wedding cakes inherently convey a celebratory
message about marriage and, therefore, the Commission’s order unconstitutionally compels it to convey
a celebratory message about same-sex marriage in conflict with its religious beliefs.”).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 286 (“[T]he act of designing and selling a wedding cake to all customers free of
discrimination does not convey a celebratory message about same-sex weddings likely to be understood
by those who view it.”).
146. Id. (“[W]e conclude that a reasonable observer would understand that Masterpiece’s compliance
with the law is not a reflection of its own beliefs.”).
147. Id. at 288 (“We note, again, that Phillips denied Craig’s and Mullins’ request without any
discussion regarding the wedding cake’s design or any possible written inscriptions.”). See also Jacquelyn
Cooper, Modern Day Segregation: States Fighting to Legally Allow Businesses to Refuse Service to SameSex Couples Under the Shield of the First Amendment, 15 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 413, 418 (2014)
(“The undisputed evidence is that Phillips categorically refused to prepare a cake for the complainants’
same-sex wedding before there was any discussion about what that cake would look like. Therefore, the
respondents’ claim that they refused to provide a cake because it would convey a message supporting
same-sex marriage was specious.”).
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customer rather than to the bakery,148 the same point might be made even if the cake
included writing. If “Happily Ever After,” or “In Sickness and in Health,” or even
“‘Til Death Do Us Part,” were written on the cake, would the public really impute
particular beliefs to the baker rather than to those commissioning the cake?
The oral and written advocacy taking place at the shopping center in
PruneYard would likely not be attributed to the mall owner149 even thought it was
speech rather than expressive conduct. There would be even less reason to impute to
the baker any views at all. Further, the Colorado anti-discrimination law, like the
Solomon Amendment, did not require that businesses endorse particular views or
even include specified contents on anything that they created. The Colorado law
merely required that businesses not discriminate.
The Masterpiece Cakeshop facts illustrate why it is so difficult to attribute
particular views to businesses. Some observers would have attributed a pro-samesex marriage view by Masterpiece Cakeshop’s willingness to supply baked goods
for a same-sex wedding; others would have attributed an anti-same-sex marriage
view by its refusal to supply a cake for such a wedding, and others might have
attributed still other views. Without an accompanying explanation, the public would
not know what to think, even if guesses might be made.
The point is not to question the sincerity of a view distinguishing between
wedding cakes and other baked goods. But that a view is sincerely held does not
alone confer First Amendment protection on practices associated with those beliefs,
as law schools sincerely disagreeing with the prior military policy might well attest.
C. Flowers
State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. 150 involved a florist’s refusal to sell flowers
to an individual for his same-sex marriage,151 notwithstanding the Washington
antidiscrimination law precluding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
in public accommodations.152 Robert Ingersoll had been a long-time patron of the
business before,153 but the owner, Barronelle Stutzman, “told Ingersoll that she
would be unable to do the flowers for his wedding because of her religious
beliefs.”154 She did, however, refer him to other florists who might be willing to
provide the floral arrangements.155

148. Craig, 370 P.3d at 286 (“[T]to the extent that the public infers from a Masterpiece wedding cake
a message celebrating same-sex marriage, that message is more likely to be attributed to the customer
than to Masterpiece.”).
149. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
150. 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017).
151. Id. at 548 (“Stutzman and her public business, Arlene’s Flowers and Gifts, refused to sell wedding
flowers to Robert Ingersoll because his betrothed, Curt Freed, is a man.”).
152. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.215 (West 2008).
153. Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d. at 549 (“By the time he and Freed became engaged, Ingersoll had
been a customer at Arlene’s Flowers for at least nine years, purchasing numerous floral arrangements
from Stutzman and spending an estimated several thousand dollars at her shop.”).
154. Id.
155. Id. (“Stutzman asserts that she gave Ingersoll the name of other florists who might be willing to
serve him.”).
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Stutzman said that she would be unwilling to make an arrangement, even if
that merely meant “replicat[ing] a prearranged bouquet from a picture book of
sample arrangements.”156 She would have been willing to “sell[] bulk flowers and
‘raw materials’” to the couple so that someone else could arrange them.157 However,
she believed that if she were to have made the arrangement, she would have been
using “imagination and artistic skill to intimately participate in a same-sex wedding
ceremony.”158
Stutzman’s argument is distinguishable from the previously discussed claim
that vendors did not want to be viewed as endorsing same-sex unions. Even if
Stutzman were certain that no one would wrongly accuse her of supporting same-sex
marriage, e.g., because she had taken great pains to make her views known, she still
might wish not to invest her personal energies in helping others have a same-sex
wedding. Further, she was not merely saying that she refused to go above and beyond
the call of duty by using her special talents to create a unique artistic creation for a
same-sex wedding—she was also unwilling to copy a prearranged bouquet.
Her belief that she would be “intimately participat[ing] in a same-sex
wedding ceremony” 159 by replicating an arrangement found in a picture seems
overstated, although perhaps she instead was suggesting that provision of flowers
would constitute an endorsement.160 She admitted that “selling flowers for an
atheistic or Muslim wedding would not be tantamount to endorsing those systems of
belief,”161 although she did not explain why one would be an endorsement and the
other would not. Her idiosyncratic approach to when the provision of floral
arrangements would constitute an endorsement underscores why the public would
simply not know whether a message was being sent or what it would be (absent
additional explanatory language) where a floral arrangement was provided for a
wedding.
Suppose that Stutzman had sold the couple loose flowers, perhaps because
a family member had wanted to arrange them.162 Members of the public might have
(wrongly) imputed endorsement of same-sex marriage to her because of her
willingness to sell flowers for use at a same-sex wedding.163
Stutzman seemed less concerned about what others might think164 and more
worried about how she herself interpreted what her participation would mean. Her
adamant refusal to invest personal skills or energies suggests that she feared being

156. Id. at 550.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (“She believes that participating, or allowing any employee of her store to participate, in a
same-sex wedding by providing custom floral arrangements and related customer service is tantamount
to endorsing marriage equality for same-sex couples.”).
161. Id.
162. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
163. See Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d at 550 (“She draws a distinction between creating floral
arrangements—even those designed by someone else—and selling bulk flowers and ‘raw materials,’
which she would be happy to do for Ingersoll and Freed.”).
164. See supra notes 153 and 160 and accompanying text.
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sullied.165 But if the fear of being sullied justifies a refusal to do business, then we
might expect many people in a variety of contexts to offer such a justification for
refusing to provide goods or services. Almost anyone could argue (perhaps even
sincerely) that he or she feared being sullied by doing business with a member of a
disfavored group.166 So, too, almost anyone could argue (perhaps even sincerely) that
he or she had reservations about employing his or her own efforts to aid “those”
people (whoever those people might be).
Stutzman’s argument that she was not engaging in orientation
discrimination but was instead simply refusing to support same-sex marriage was
rejected.167 The court also rejected that her message of non-support for same-sex
marriage would have been understood by the public168—a refusal might be based on
a religious view or, instead, a lack of sufficient supplies or personnel.169
If Stutzman had wanted to communicate her lack of support of same-sex
marriage, she could have posted a sign. Presumably, Ingersoll would have gone
elsewhere.170 Of course, it would not be surprising if Ingersoll would have become a
regular customer elsewhere and would have refused to make non-wedding-related
purchases at Arlene’s Flowers.171 Nor would it have been surprising if other
customers had decided to take all of their business elsewhere if the floral shop’s
policy were well-known.172
The point here is not that an individual should be entitled to discriminate as
long as she makes her discriminatory policy publicly known,173 but merely to suggest
that some businesses might be reluctant to post such signs even if such a posting
would remove or significantly decrease the likelihood that such a vendor would even

165. Cf. Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim Within the Same-Sex Marriage Controversy,
17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343, 414 (2008) (“Traditionalists are concerned about signal distortion or
(less politely) pollution and contagion.”).
166. Cf. Cooper, supra note 147, at 429 (discussing “religious leaders, who believed they were sullied
by associating with the ‘wrong’ people”).
167. Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d at 553 (“[W]e reject Stutzman’s proposed distinction between status
and conduct fundamentally linked to that status.”).
168. Id. at 557 (“The decision to either provide or refuse to provide flowers for a wedding does not
inherently express a message about that wedding.”).
169. Id. (“Accordingly, an outside observer may be left to wonder whether a wedding was declined
for one of at least three reasons: a religious objection, insufficient staff, or insufficient stock.”).
170. See Andrew Koppelman, Greenawalt and the Place of Religion: Comment on the McElroy
Lecture, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, March 16, 2016, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 369,
377 (2016) (“If free speech allows Elane Photography to signal its opposition to such marriages, that
would probably suffice to persuade gay customers—at least, those who are not spoiling for a fight—to
look elsewhere with no formal change in the antidiscrimination law.”).
171. See Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d at 549 (noting that the couple felt hurt that their business was no
longer “good business” for the floral shop).
172. Cf. id. at 550 (“Aside from Ingersoll and Freed, she has served gay and lesbian customers in the
past for other, non-wedding-related flower orders.”).
173. But see generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Facilitating Boycotts of Discriminatory Organizations
Through an Informed Association Statute, 87 MINN. L. REV. 481 (2002) (advocating that organizations
publicly announcing their own exclusionary policies be afforded a safe harbor under public
accommodations statutes).
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be asked to provide services for a same-sex wedding.174 Not only might such
businesses not be asked to provide services that the businesses would refuse to
provide in any case, but they might also not be asked to provide services that the
businesses did want to provide.
Arlene’s Flowers’ claim, if recognized, might mean that vendors would be
free to refuse to provide services for disfavored individuals or, perhaps, disfavored
customs or practices whenever the vendor felt misgivings about investing personal
energies in the provision of such services. Perhaps it is true that in many instances
others would be willing to provide the needed services,175 although part of the point
of public accommodation laws is that businesses holding themselves open to the
public should not be free to discriminate in this way.
III. CONCLUSION
Various vendors have claimed the right not to provide wedding-related
services to same-sex couples, local law notwithstanding, because of the First
Amendment right not to endorse something in which they do not believe. But there
are several reasons why no such First Amendment right exists. The First Amendment
right not to speak is less robust than commonly thought, especially when the State is
not prescribing the content of the message at issue. Further, when the public does not
understand the message unless further explanation is offered, the “message” itself
likely does not trigger First Amendment guarantees.
Public accommodation laws are of growing importance because the Nation
seems to be growing increasingly fractured along a variety of fault lines. This is not
the time to gut such laws merely because some individuals have sincere reservations
about providing services for members of disfavored groups. The claimed right not to
speak in these vendor cases has no basis in the First Amendment as currently
understood. Further, recognition of such a right would do great harm and lead to
further tearing of the social fabric, a result that no one should applaud.

174. Cf. id. at 489 (noting that the Boy Scouts lost some public support when their exclusionary
policies became known).
175. But cf. Georgia Chudoba, Conscience in America: The Slippery Slope of Mixing Morality with
Medicine, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 85, 90 (2007) (“California currently has a law requiring that emergency
services be provided to a patient ‘for any condition in which the person is in danger of loss of life, or
serious injury or illness, at any health facility . . . that maintains and operates an emergency
department.’”).

